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Missed Opportunity or Dodged Bullet? The Tenth
Circuit’s Non-decision in Rocky Mountain Christian
Church v. Board of County Commissioners
I. INTRODUCTION
In Rocky Mountain Christian Church v. Board of County
Commissioners,1 the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit considered whether Boulder County officials violated the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act2 (“RLUIPA”)
when it denied the Rocky Mountain Christian Church’s (“Rocky
Mountain” or “RMCC”) special use application, which would have
allowed RMCC to expand its Boulder County facilities.3 In a
relatively straightforward application of RLUIPA’s statutory
language, the court concluded that Boulder County had violated
RLUIPA’s requirement that Rocky Mountain’s permit be considered
on “equal terms” with secular institutions in the application process
and that, as a religious institution, Rocky Mountain should be free
from exclusion or unreasonable limitations on its assemblies or
structures within the county.4
This Note argues that although the Tenth Circuit correctly
decided Rocky Mountain, the case will have limited precedential
value for two reasons. First, the case’s procedural posture and the
county’s failure to raise key issues and arguments on appeal severely
limited the court’s ability to review the district court’s decision.
Second, while the court touched on two important issues that have
caused circuit splits over the correct interpretation of RLUIPA’s
equal terms provision, the court ultimately, albeit prudently, failed to
weigh in decisively on these issues.
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In 1978, Boulder County took affirmative steps to “curb[] urban
sprawl, maintain[] open space to preserve the county’s rural

1.
2.
3.
4.

613 F.3d 1229 (10th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 978 (2011).
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc–2000cc-5 (2006).
Rocky Mountain, 613 F.3d at 1233.
Id. at 1236–40.
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character, and sustain[] agriculture” by enacting its comprehensive
plan (“Comprehensive Plan”).5 Pursuant to the Comprehensive Plan,
the County Land Use Code designated certain areas as “Agricultural
Districts.”6 Within the Agricultural Districts, “offices, warehouses,
and retail stores are prohibited,” and all facilities with “occupancy
loads exceeding 100 people [must] apply for a special use permit.”7
The county used numerous criteria when deciding whether to grant
a special use application, including whether the proposed use was in
“accordance with the comprehensive plan, and not an over-intensive
use of land or excessive depletion of natural resources.”8
Although located in an agricultural district, RMCC’s fifty-five
acre campus shares proximity with a number of structures and
facilities. These include several subdivisions, “a wastewater treatment
facility, a high school, and the 500,000 square foot Boulder
Technology Center.”9 RMCC’s facilities consist of a 106,000 square
foot main building, a maintenance building, and numerous
temporary modular units.10 The size of RMCC’s current facilities are
the result of gradual expansion since its founding in 1984 and two
successful applications for special use permits, which allowed Rocky
Mountain to increase the size of its buildings to their present
dimensions.11
RMCC submitted the special use application at issue in Rocky
Mountain in 2004 and “met opposition at each level of review.”12
Despite RMCC’s efforts to scale back its proposed expansion after
initial opposition, the county partially denied RMCC’s modified
application, allowing RMCC to expand only its main worship
building and replace their temporary modular units with a small
permanent building.13 Shortly thereafter, RMCC sued Boulder
County under RLUIPA in district court. At the close of RMCC’s
5. Id. at 1233.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 1233–34 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
9. Id. at 1234. Neither the high school nor the Boulder Technology Center are subject
to the requirements of the Comprehensive Plan. Id. at 1234 n.1 (“The high school is not
subject to the County’s zoning authority and the Boulder Technology Center’s industrial
zoning district predates the Comprehensive Plan.”).
10. Id. at 1234.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 1235.
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evidence, the county moved for judgment as a matter of law under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a).14 The court denied the
motion on all issues but the county’s affirmative defenses, which the
court deferred.15 Ultimately, “[a]fter a twelve-day trial, the jury
found for RMCC” under RLUIPA’s equal terms, unreasonable
limitations, and substantial burden provisions.16 Although the jury
awarded RMCC no damages, the court “entered a permanent
injunction requiring the County to approve RMCC’s special use
application” and “denied the County’s renewed motion for
judgment as a matter of law.”17 The county appealed.18
III. SIGNIFICANT LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. General Provisions of RLUIPA
Congress enacted RLUIPA to protect individuals from “land use
regulation that would impose a substantial burden on the person’s
free exercise of religion.”19 A substantial burden will invalidate a
regulation unless the government can demonstrate that the burden
“is the least restrictive means of furthering [a] compelling
governmental interest.”20 In addition to the substantial burden
provision, RLUIPA identifies and prohibits three other “categories”
of discriminatory government conduct. First, under the equal terms
provision, the government may not “implement a land use
regulation in a manner that treats a religious assembly or institution
on less than equal terms with a nonreligious assembly or
institution.”21 Second, under the nondiscrimination provision,
RLUIPA prohibits religious discrimination against any assembly or
institution when implementing land use regulations.22 Finally, under
the exclusion and limits provision, “[n]o government shall impose or
implement a land use regulation that: (A) totally excludes religious

14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. John J. Dvorske, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Operation of Religious
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 181 A.L.R. FED. 247 (2010).
20. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1) (2006).
21. Id. § 2000cc(b)(1).
22. Id. § 2000cc(b)(2).
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assemblies from a jurisdiction; or (B) unreasonably limits religious
assemblies, institutions, or structures within a jurisdiction.”23
B. Interaction Between RLUIPA and the Free Exercise Clause
Although RLUIPA is a relatively new statute, key issues have
already emerged regarding the interaction between the
Constitution’s Free Exercise Clause24 and the equal terms provision
of RLUIPA.25 First, circuit courts disagree about whether courts may
weigh the nature of the challenged action against the government’s
regulatory interest, which would essentially provide an affirmative
defense for the government in RLUIPA cases.26 The second
important issue courts face is “whether the equal terms provision
contains a ‘similarly situated’ requirement.”27
1. What level of scrutiny, if any, should the court apply to government
action under RLUIPA?
The Third and Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeals are at odds as
to whether RLUIPA allows non-neutral government actions to stand
so long as they pass strict scrutiny. In Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town
of Surfside,28 the Eleventh Circuit answered that question in the
affirmative. The court held that the Town of Surfside violated
RLUIPA when it denied special use permits to two Orthodox Jewish
congregations.29 Both congregations had been meeting in the
business district until the town denied one of the groups a special
business permit to continue operating in its location.30 Neither
group attempted to reapply for a variance or to relocate because only
23. Id. § 2000cc(b)(3) (emphasis added). The Rocky Mountain court discussed only the
second prong of the exclusion and limits provision, referring to RLUIPA’s prohibition on
regulation that unreasonably limits religious assemblies as the “unreasonable limitations”
provision. The remainder of this Note employs this shorthand label.
24. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .”).
25. See River of Life Kingdom Ministries v. Vill. of Hazel Crest, 611 F.3d 367, 368 (7th
Cir. 2010); Rocky Mountain Christian Church v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 613 F.3d 1229,
1237 (10th Cir. 2010); Sarah Keeton Campbell, Comment, Restoring RLUIPA’s Equal Terms
Provision, 58 DUKE L.J. 1071, 1086–93 (2009).
26. Rocky Mountain, 613 F.3d at 1237.
27. Id. at 1238.
28. 366 F.3d 1214 (11th Cir. 2004).
29. Id. at 1219.
30. Id. at 1220.
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one zoning district allowed churches, and they claimed that no
suitable land was available in that district.31 The town maintained
that its strict zoning of the business district was required to maintain
a strong tax base and that it could not afford to place noneconomic
establishments there without risking economic instability.32
The court looked to the Supreme Court’s Free Exercise
jurisprudence to determine what level of scrutiny, if any, RLUIPA
afforded the town’s interest in its strict zoning policy. The court
concluded that RLUIPA codified the Supreme Court’s SmithLukumi precedent that requires courts to strictly scrutinize any
ordinance that is not both neutral and generally applicable.33 By
treating the synagogues differently than similarly situated secular
assemblies, the town’s ordinance was neither neutral nor generally
applicable. Through the lens of strict scrutiny, the town’s ordinance
neither furthered compelling governmental interests, nor was it
narrowly tailored to further those interests.34 The court reasoned that
the “proffered interests of retail synergy [were] not pursued against
analogous nonreligious conduct [e.g., meeting in a private club], and
those interests could be achieved by narrower ordinances that do not
improperly distinguish between similar secular and religious
assemblies.”35
By contrast, the Third Circuit has rejected the notion that
RLUIPA allows a non-neutral ordinance to survive even though it
withstands strict scrutiny. In Lighthouse Institute for Evangelism, Inc.
v. City of Long Branch,36 the court concluded “that RLUIPA’s Equal
Terms provision operates on a strict liability standard; strict scrutiny
does not come into play.”37 The court based this conclusion on the
“clear divide” between the substantial burden provision, which
expressly includes the balancing test in the statutory language, and

31. Id. at 1220–21.
32. Id. at 1221–22.
33. Id. at 1232 (citing Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508
U.S. 520 (1993); Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990),
superseded in part by statute, Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103141, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993) (Notably, the Supreme Court has invalidated RFRA as applied to
states and local governments in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). Congress has
since amended RFRA through the RLUIPA.).
34. Rocky Mountain, 613 F.3d at 1235.
35. Id.
36. 510 F.3d 253 (3d Cir. 2007).
37. Id. at 269 (emphasis added).
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the equal terms provision, which does not.38 The court
acknowledged that its conclusion parted ways with the Eleventh
Circuit. The court reasoned that although it agreed with the
Eleventh Circuit’s “deference to Congress’s intent to codify the
[Supreme Court’s] Free Exercise precedent,” the statutory language
manifested Congress’s intent to exclude a strict scrutiny analysis from
RLUIPA’s equal terms provision.39 As such, the court held that “if a
land use regulation treats religious assemblies or institutions on less
than equal terms with nonreligious assemblies or institutions that are
no less harmful to the governmental objectives in enacting the
regulation, that regulation—without more—fails under RLUIPA.”40
2. Does the equal terms provision contain a “similarly situated”
requirement?
Once again, the Third and Eleventh Circuits have squared off in
determining to what extent RLUIPA’s equal terms provision
requires religious organizations, in order to establish a violation, to
identify a similarly situated nonreligious comparator that had been
treated favorably.41 In Lighthouse, discussed above, the Third Circuit
concluded that “the Equal Terms provision does in fact require . . . a
secular comparator that is similarly situated as to the regulatory
purpose of the regulation in question—similar to First Amendment
Free Exercise jurisprudence.”42 As a result, the city’s regulation
would violate the equal terms provision only if it treated religious
groups worse than secular groups “that are similarly situated as to the
[City’s stated] regulatory purpose.”43 This led the court to conclude
38. See id. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a), with id. § 2000cc(b).
39. Lighthouse, 510 F.3d at 269.
40. Id.
41. Implied from the language of the statute, the “similarly situated” requirement is
drawn by analogy from Equal Protection jurisprudence. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(b)(1) (2006)
(“No government shall impose or implement a land use regulation in a manner that treats a
religious assembly or institution on less than equal terms with a nonreligious assembly or
institution.”); Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1229 (11th Cir.
2004) (citing City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985)).
42. Lighthouse, 510 F.3d at 264.
43. Id. at 266. The court stated that to establish a violation of the RLUIPA Equal
Terms provision the plaintiff “must show (1) it is a religious assembly or institution, (2) subject
to a land use regulation, which regulation (3) treats the religious assembly on less than equal
terms with (4) a nonreligious assembly or institution (5) that causes no lesser harm to the
interests the regulation seeks to advance.” Id. at 270. The first four elements of an equal terms
cause of action under the Third Circuit’s test are identical to the test in the Eleventh Circuit.
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that the city’s land use plan did not violate RLUIPA even though it
did not allow a church to locate in the downtown business district.
The city’s goal in adopting the plan was to “achieve redevelopment
of an underdeveloped and underutilized segment of the City.”44 The
court reasoned that churches are not similarly situated to the secular
organizations and assemblies allowed by the plan in light of the
plan’s goals and aims.45
By contrast, the Midrash court seems to take inconsistent
positions on whether a similarly situated comparator is required at
all. On the one hand, the Midrash court expressly stated that the
equal terms provision “lacks the ‘similarly situated’ requirement
usually found in equal protection analysis.”46 At the same time, the
court seemed to inadvertently invoke the similarly situated
comparator analysis in concluding that the Town of Surfside violated
RLUIPA.47 Putting aside these inconsistencies, it is clear that it gave
no consideration to the town’s regulatory goals in determining
whether the synagogues were similarly situated to other assemblies
allowed to locate in the business district. Instead, the opinion sought
to determine whether a violation occurred by exploring the
boundaries of key terms used in RLUIPA’s equal terms provision.48
According to the court, the plain meaning of “assembly” is a “group
gathered for a common purpose.”49 Under this natural, though
broad, definition, the city’s disparate treatment of a synagogue,
which was not allowed in the business district, and a private club,
Id. (citing Primera Iglesia Bautista Hispana of Boca Raton, Inc. v. Broward Cnty., 450 F.3d
1295, 1307 (11th Cir. 2006)).
44. Id. at 270.
45. Id. at 270–71.
46. Id. at 1229 (“[W]hile § (b)(1) has the ‘feel’ of an equal protection law, it lacks the
‘similarly situated’ requirement usually found in equal protection analysis.”).
47. Id. at 1231 (“Finding that private clubs and lodges are similarly situated to churches
and synagogues, we turn to whether under RLUIPA, Surfside may treat them differently.”).
Despite the court’s baffling language, it is clear that even if Midrash is read in light of later
Eleventh Circuit cases to require a “similarly situated” comparator, see infra note 52, then it
must also be read to define that requirement so broadly as to remove from it much meaning.
48. Midrash, 366 F.3d at 1230–31. The Third Circuit characterized the Eleventh
Circuit’s approach as an application of the “natural perimeter” test developed by Justice Harlan
in Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970). Under that test “a regulation is considered
neutral and presumptively valid . . . if its ‘circumference . . . encircles a class so broad that it can
be fairly concluded that religious institutions could be thought to fall within the natural
perimeter.’” Lighthouse, 510 F.3d at 267 (quoting Walz, 397 U.S. at 696 (Harlan, J.,
concurring) (second ellipses in original)).
49. Midrash, 366 F.3d at 1231.
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which was allowed, violated RLUIPA.50 Thus, as another court
noted, the effect of the Midrash court’s rule is that “where private
clubs are allowed, so must churches be.”51
Later Eleventh Circuit cases have slightly modified the court’s
original stance to expressly require a similarly situated comparator in
some circumstances.52 For example, in Konikov v. Orange County,
the court apparently limited Midrash by requiring a similarly situated
secular comparator where a church brought an as-applied challenge
to a statute.53 As a result, even the Eleventh Circuit seemingly
restricts its otherwise expansive view of the RLUIPA equal terms
provision by requiring identification of a favored similarly situated
secular comparator for a plaintiff to prove that the government is
selectively enforcing a facially neutral statute.54
IV. THE COURT’S DECISION
In Rocky Mountain Christian Church v. Board of County
Commissioners,55 the Tenth Circuit upheld the district court’s denial
of the county’s motion for judgment as a matter of law, effectively

50. Id. The court referred approvingly to the town’s definition of “private club” as “a
building and facilities or premises, owned and operated by a corporation, association, person or
persons for social, educational or recreational purposes, but not primarily for profit and not
primarily to render a service which is customarily carried on as a business.” Id. (quoting
SURFSIDE, FLA., ZONING ORDINANCE § 90-2(20)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
51. River of Life Kingdom Ministries v. Vill. of Hazel Crest, 611 F.3d 367, 369 (7th
Cir. 2010).
52. See Konikov v. Orange Cnty., 410 F.3d 1317, 1327–29 (11th Cir. 2005); see also
River of Life, 611 F.3d at 383–84 (Sykes, J., dissenting); Lighthouse, 510 F.3d at 268. The
Midrash court itself seems to take inconsistent positions on whether a “similarly situated”
comparator is required. Compare Midrash, 366 F.3d. at 1229 (“[W]hile § (b)(1) has the ‘feel’
of an equal protection law, it lacks the ‘similarly situated’ requirement usually found in equal
protection analysis.”), with id. at 1231 (“Finding that private clubs and lodges are similarly
situated to churches and synagogues, we turn to whether under RLUIPA, Surfside may treat
them differently.”). Despite the court’s baffling language, it is clear that even if Midrash is read
in light of later Eleventh Circuit cases to require a “similarly situated” comparator, then it must
also be read to define that requirement so broadly as to remove from it much meaning.
53. See Konikov, 410 F.3d at 1327–29.
54. See id.; River of Life, 611 F.3d at 384 (Sykes, J., dissenting) (“In an as-applied
‘selective enforcement’ claim, however, the [Konikov court] held that an equal-terms plaintiff
will generally be required to identify a similarly situated nonreligious assembly or institution
that was treated more favorably.” (citing Primera Iglesia Bautista Hispana of Boca Raton, Inc.
v. Broward Cnty., 450 F.3d 1295, 1311 (11th Cir. 2006))).
55. 613 F.3d 1229 (10th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 978 (2011).
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sustaining the jury’s conclusion that the county’s denial of RMCC’s
special use application violated RLUIPA.56
A. Standard of Review: Sufficiency of the Evidence
Because of the procedural posture of the case, the Tenth Circuit
applied the highly deferential “sufficiency of the evidence” standard
in reviewing the district court proceedings.57 Under this standard,
the court could overturn denial of the county’s motion only if it
concluded that when “‘viewed in the light most favorable to the
non-moving party, the evidence and all reasonable inferences to be
drawn from it point but one way, in favor of the moving party.’”58
As a result, the county bore the burden to show that no reasonable
inference supported the jury’s verdict. The court clearly stated its
intention to avoid weighing the credibility of witnesses or other
evidence, challenging the factual conclusions of the jury, or
otherwise substituting its judgment for the jury’s.59
B. The Court’s Discussion of RLUIPA’s Substantive Provisions
The court discussed the merits of the county’s arguments on
only two of RLUIPA’s substantive provisions: the equal terms and
the unreasonable limitations provisions. The court affirmed the
permanent injunction entered against the city on those two prongs
of the jury’s verdict, which obviated the need to “review the
sufficiency of the evidence of the substantial burden claim.”60 The
county also preserved a constitutional challenge to RLUIPA’s
substantial burden provision, but failed to do so regarding the other
provisions because it failed to adequately brief those issues.61 Because
the permanent injunction could be sustained on grounds of the
equal terms and the unreasonable limitations provisions, the court
declined to reach the county’s constitutional challenge based on the
substantial burden provision. The court reasoned that it generally
“wish[es] to avoid, when possible, deciding constitutional questions

56. Id. at 1233.
57. Id. at 1235–36.
58. Id. at 1235 (quoting Praseuth v. Rubbermaid, Inc., 406 F.3d 1245, 1250 (10th
Cir. 2005)).
59. See, e.g., id. at 1235–36, 1239.
60. Id. at 1239.
61. Id.
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and thereby overturn legislative enactments and etch in stone rules of
law beyond the reach of most democratic process.”62
1. The court’s equal terms analysis
On appeal, the county made two important arguments
challenging the district court ruling. First, it argued that “RMCC
did not present sufficient evidence for the jury to find that it violated
RLUIPA’s equal terms provision.”63 Second, it argued that it was
entitled to an affirmative defense because the Comprehensive Plan—
and, hence, the regulation of RMCC—was rationally related to a
legitimate governmental interest.64
The county’s first argument struck at the heart of the similarly
situated comparator issue. At trial, RMCC pointed to Dawson
School, a neighboring facility that successfully applied to the county
for expansion in 1995.65 Both parties presented evidence attempting
to emphasize either the school’s similarity or dissimilarity to RMCC.
The county argued that the school’s expansion was “half the size of
RMCC’s in terms of raw square footage,” that RMCC proposed a
dramatic expansion of one building rather than expansions to several
smaller buildings, and that the traffic caused by RMCC would
exceed the school’s by ten times.66 On the other hand, RMCC
testified that both proposals would have allowed facilities to expand
to around 200,000 square feet, both resulted in identical expansions
of the number of students served, and both were sited on
“agricultural lands of importance.”67 The evidence presented by the
parties allowed the reviewing court to conclude easily that
“[a]lthough the two proposed expansions were not identical, the
many substantial similarities allow for a reasonable jury to conclude
that RMCC and Dawson School were similarly situated.”68
The court also easily dispensed with the county’s affirmative
defense/scrutiny argument. Without deciding whether or not
RLUIPA even allows courts to inquire as to the government’s
62. Id. (quoting United States v. Cardenas-Alatorre, 485 F.3d 1111, 1115 n.9 (10th
Cir. 2007)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
63. Id. at 1236.
64. Id. at 1237.
65. Id. at 1236–37.
66. Id. at 1236.
67. Id. at 1236–37.
68. Id. at 1237.
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justification for a non-neutral statute, the court concluded that
where a statute is discriminatorily applied the rule is “subject to strict
scrutiny, not rational basis review.”69 Because the court had already
concluded that the county treated RMCC less favorably than a
similarly situated comparator, the Comprehensive Plan was applied
non-neutrally and had to withstand strict scrutiny.70 The county did
not argue that it enjoyed a “strict scrutiny defense” and thus waived
the argument.71
2. The court’s unreasonable limitations analysis
Citing only to RLUIPA’s mandate that a land-use regulation
may not totally exclude or place unreasonable limitations on a
religious assembly in a given jurisdiction, the court concluded that
the evidence at trial “was more than adequate for a reasonable jury
to find for RMCC on this claim.”72 Despite evidence that the county
had approved several other churches’ permits, the court emphasized
testimony from several witnesses that revealed a general animus
against churches in applying for special use applications.73 The record
also revealed specific opposition to RMCC’s efforts to “appease the
County’s concerns” and other actions by the county that appeared to
be designed to prolong the process and increase costs for RMCC.74
Together, these instances would support a jury finding of specific
discriminatory limitations the county sought to impose against
RMCC.75 Thus, the court upheld the district court’s conclusion that
the county’s implementation of the land use regulation unreasonably
limited RMCC.76

69. Id.
70. Id. at 1237–38.
71. Id. at 1238.
72. Id. at 1238–39 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(b)(3) (2006)).
73. Id. at 1238. One county commissioner even reportedly said, “[T]here will never be
another mega church . . . in Boulder County.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted).
74. Id. at 1238–39.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 1239.
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V. ANALYSIS
Although Rocky Mountain demonstrates a straightforward
application of RLUIPA’s equal terms and unreasonable limitations
provisions, its precedential value will be limited for two reasons.
First, the case’s procedural posture required the court to give great
deference to the jury’s findings. This deference, coupled with the
county’s failure to adequately preserve the constitutional issue and
properly raise the affirmative defense/scrutiny issue for those
provisions, allowed the court to sidestep complicated legal issues and
simply review findings of fact that it concluded it was obligated to
uphold. Second, the court refused to adopt either the Third or
Eleventh Circuit position on whether RLUIPA’s equal terms
provision requires evaluation of a similarly situated secular
comparator. The result of the court’s willingness to punt (or bide its
time) is that this case will likely remain an outlier, providing little
guidance for a future court’s attempt to sort out the “similarly
situated” question.
A. The Case’s Posture and Lawyering Diminished Rocky Mountain’s
Precedential Value
At the outset, it is clear that the court correctly decided the equal
terms and unreasonable limitations claims, given the heavy deference
it was obligated to give to the trial court findings. What is less clear is
how much difference it would have made had the case come up on
summary judgment, or even on a motion to dismiss. While the
intricacies of the civil procedure questions are beyond the scope of
this Note, they will be important as future judges and practitioners
attempt to apply Rocky Mountain. Some of the precedential value of
the case is lost simply because so few cases proceed to trial, and
Rocky Mountain seemed to turn on the testimony of witnesses
revealing animus against expansion by RMCC and other churches.77
This is especially clear in the court’s review of the claim that the
county placed unreasonable limitations on RMCC. The jury
instructions simply required jurors to determine whether the
county’s regulation deprived RMCC and others of “reasonable
77. See, e.g., id. at 1238–39 (emphasizing the conflicting testimony surrounding
RMCC’s efforts to appease the county and the county’s apparent determination to oppose the
proposed expansion).
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opportunities to practice their religion.”78 It is easy to imagine that
same question coming before a court as a question of law on
undisputed facts. Obviously, the court’s discussion and deference to
the trial court will provide little guidance to a lower court in
determining what “unreasonably limits” a religious entity.79
Even more important than the court’s review of the trial court’s
findings, the county’s failure to adequately raise several key
arguments allowed the court to sidestep some important and
unresolved issues.80 The most important of these was whether the
county was entitled to an affirmative defense that would have
allowed the action to stand so long as it passed strict scrutiny. The
court’s conclusion that the county’s regulation was neither neutral
nor generally applicable should have come as no surprise to the
county. In 2006, the Tenth Circuit made clear that it favors “a factspecific inquiry to determine . . . whether the facts support an
argument that the challenged rule is applied in a discriminatory
fashion that disadvantages religious groups or organizations.”81 Such
discrimination, coupled with “‘a pattern of ad hoc discretionary
decisions’” may amount to “a system of individualized exemptions
triggering strict scrutiny.”82 In Rocky Mountain, where the county
knew that the finder of fact had already identified discriminatory
78. Id. at 1238 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
79. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(b)(3) (2006). Of course, it is possible that the statute’s
language was meant to allow the courts to give content to the reasonableness standard through
incremental, ad hoc judicial process. However, because the court did not have occasion to
determine whether the county’s actions constituted an unreasonable limitation as a matter of
law, Rocky Mountain will be of little use in such a process.
80. One of these issues is the constitutionality of RLUIPA. A number of courts have
already considered whether RLUIPA passes constitutional muster. They have overwhelmingly
answered that question in the affirmative. See, e.g., Westchester Day Sch. v. Vill. of
Mamaroneck, 504 F.3d 338, 353–56 (2d Cir. 2007) (upholding RLUIPA’s constitutionality
in face of Fourteenth Amendment, Establishment Clause, Commerce Clause, and Tenth
Amendment challenges); Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1235–
43 (11th Cir. 2004) (upholding RLUIPA’s constitutionality when challenged on
Establishment Clause, Fourteenth Amendment, and Tenth Amendment grounds);
Mayweathers v. Newland, 314 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2002) (upholding RLUIPA’s
constitutionality in the face of Spending Clause, Establishment Clause, federalism arguments,
and other constitutional challenges). Because the Rocky Mountain court correctly concluded
that constitutional review was not warranted in this case, the corresponding lack of guidance to
lower courts on this issue is both appropriate and self-evident.
81. Grace United Methodist Church v. City of Cheyenne, 451 F.3d 643, 651 (10th
Cir. 2006).
82. Id. at 653 (quoting Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277, 1299 (10th Cir.
2004)).
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animus on the county’s part, it could have easily argued that the
court should at least allow the county to demonstrate a compelling
governmental interest. Of course, demonstrating that the county’s
regulation was narrowly tailored to advance this compelling
governmental interest would likely have been impossible.83
Nevertheless, this case serves as a lesson to future advocates by
illustrating RLUIPA’s fertile ground for interpretive arguments and
providing a cautionary tale to attorneys seeking to raise (and
preserve) the proper issues.
Fortunately, there is little in the Rocky Mountain opinion that
suggests that the court would resolve the affirmative defense
question in favor of the Eleventh Circuit approach, and advocates
should hesitate to rely on the court adopting this approach in the
future. Courts and commentators alike have criticized the Eleventh
Circuit’s strict scrutiny gloss.84 Despite the Eleventh Circuit’s stated
rationale, the Midrash approach essentially attempts to remedy one
interpretive error with another. To begin with, this approach first
gives an unnecessarily broad definition of “assembly” and
“institution,” which are key RLUIPA terms.85 This broad definition
fosters a real danger that religious institutions will be immunized
from local zoning ordinances. For example, if a private club—an
assembly—could locate in a business district, a church must be
allowed as well unless the court allows the government some way to
rationalize its exclusion. That will be possible only if RLUIPA allows
the court to scrutinize the government’s objectives. As such, the
Eleventh Circuit has read a “compelling governmental interest” test

83. See, e.g., Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term—Foreword: In Search of
Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L.
REV. 1, 8 (1972) (describing strict scrutiny as “‘strict’ in theory and fatal in fact”). But see
Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict Scrutiny in
the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 797 (2006) (“Contrary to the Gunther myth, laws
can (and do) survive strict scrutiny with considerable frequency.”). Even Winkler acknowledges
in his empirical study of the application of strict scrutiny that local laws limiting the free
exercise of religion, when applied in a discriminatory manner, “are invariably overturned.” Id.
at 796–97, 830–31, 857–62.
84. See supra Part III.B.1 (discussing the Third Circuit’s criticism that addition of the
strict scrutiny analysis to the equal terms provision ignores congressional intent to establish a
“clear divide” between the test for equal terms and the test of substantial burden).
85. As noted above, the Eleventh Circuit defined “assembly” as “a group gathered for a
common purpose” and “institution” as “‘an established society or corporation: an
establishment or foundation esp. of a public character.’” Midrash, 366 F.3d at 1230–31
(quoting WEBSTER’S 3D NEW INTERNATIONAL UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 1171 (1993)).
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into the equal terms provision merely to attempt to cabin its first
interpretive mistake. Thus, the most appropriate way to characterize
the Eleventh Circuit’s stance is an unnecessary mechanism to assure
that the court’s expansive application of the equal terms provision
does not “overprotect religious assembles [sic] in comparison to
their closest secular counterparts.”86
If faced with a situation more closely analogous to Midrash or
Lighthouse, discussed above, the court should instead adopt the strict
liability scheme supported by the actual language of RLUIPA and
favored by the Third Circuit. Although this would also threaten to
“overprotect religious assemblies” if left unchecked, the court could
then cabin the possible claims under the equal terms provision by
requiring the government to treat assemblies and institutions on
equal terms only in light of the government’s regulatory purpose or
goals.87 It could do so by either adopting the Third Circuit’s
similarly situated rule in Lighthouse, or by adopting a substantially
similar standard. Under such an approach, our hypothetical church
and club would not be similarly situated comparators because a
church does more violence to the government’s stated goal of
economic development. But, if the government allowed some other
secular assembly or institution that posed a similar threat to the
government’s regulatory purpose—such as the headquarters for a
political party—excluding the church would violate RLUIPA’s equal
terms provision.
B. Giving Effect to RLUIPA’s Equal Terms Provision Through
Similarly Situated Comparators
The court’s analysis in Rocky Mountain leaves its stance on the
similarly situated issue unclear. The court seems to assume, without
deciding, that a similarly situated comparator was necessary in this
case. Yet the court prudently gave no indication on how it might
decide the similarly situated question in future cases. The above
discussion demonstrates that Midrash and Lighthouse offer two
contrasting approaches to interpreting RLUIPA’s equal terms
86. River of Life Kingdom Ministries v. Vill. of Hazel Crest, 611 F.3d 367, 370–71
(7th Cir. 2010) (“There is no textual basis for the [strict scrutiny] gloss, and religious
discrimination is expressly prohibited elsewhere in the statute. The gloss was needed only to
solve a problem of the court’s own creation.”).
87. See Lighthouse Institute for Evangelism, Inc. v. City of Long Branch, 510 F.3d 253,
266 (3d Cir. 2007).

113

DO NOT DELETE

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

4/5/2011 7:50 PM

2011

provision, both weighing in on the affirmative defense and
comparator issues. Although the Third Circuit’s Lighthouse approach
is more logically and textually sound, especially in cases like Rocky
Mountain, each approach has its ardent supporters and detractors.88
While the court will eventually need to evaluate these approaches
and either adopt one of them or devise its own, Rocky Mountain was
not the appropriate case to do so for two reasons.
First, the case would have come out the same either way. Under
the Eleventh Circuit’s unrefined Midrash approach, Dawson School
would certainly have qualified as an “institution” under the plain
meaning of that word.89 Because Dawson School was allowed to
expand and RMCC was not, the county violated the equal terms
provision. This is even truer under the Eleventh Circuit’s later
Konikov case, which would probably require a similarly situated
comparator in an as-applied challenge anyway.90 Likewise, under the
Third Circuit’s Lighthouse standard—which will find an assembly or
institution similarly situated only in light of its comparative impact
on the government’s regulatory purpose—the county would have a
hard time showing that Dawson School was not similarly situated. At
the trial court level, the jury resolved this question in favor of
RMCC.91 However, even if the relevant facts had been undisputed,
Dawson School was almost certainly similarly situated as a matter of
law because the county’s stated purpose was to maintain the rural
character of the district and avoid over-intensive use.92 In light of this
regulatory purpose, the two institutions were at least equally
harmful. Thus, the county violated the equal terms provision by
treating Dawson School more favorably.

88. See, e.g., River of Life, 611 F.3d at 370. In River of Life, decided a few months after
Rocky Mountain, Judge Posner criticized the Lighthouse approach as relying too heavily on the
government’s subjective statement of “regulatory purpose,” which is too easy to manipulate.
Id. at 371. Judge Posner favored a similar test, but would rely on an ordinance’s “regulatory
criteria,” which he contends are more objective. Id. see also id. at 374 (Cudahy, J., concurring)
(“I see little real contrast in basic approach or result between the Third Circuit and the
majority analysis . . . .”). Judge Sykes, dissenting in River of Life, rejected both the Third
Circuit approach and the majority’s modification, favoring instead the Eleventh Circuit
approach, “with some elaboration.” Id. at 377 (Sykes, J., dissenting).
89. See Midrash, 366 F.3d at 1230–31.
90. See Konikov v. Orange Cnty., 410 F.3d 1317, 1327–29 (11th Cir. 2005).
91. Rocky Mountain Christian Church v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 613 F.3d 1229,
1235–36 (10th Cir. 2010).
92. See id. at 1233.
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Advocates briefing these issues in the future may be tempted to
argue that Rocky Mountain demonstrates the Tenth Circuit’s implicit
adoption of the Third Circuit’s similarly situated approach. Indeed,
the court’s discussion of which facts were relevant at the trial level
seems to indicate that the surrounding area’s designation as an
agricultural district, and the regulatory purposes accompanying that
distinction, were considered when the jury decided that Dawson
School and RMCC were similarly situated.93 However, such a
reading of Rocky Mountain makes more of this case than the text
supports. Rather, the case should be read to reveal nothing more
than understandable hesitation to adopt a test ill-suited to this type
of case. As this Note demonstrates, resolving the circuit split on
either the scrutiny or similarly situated issues would likely require
resolution of both issues. Legally significant factual dissimilarities
between Rocky Mountain and the other cases addressing these issues
makes this set of facts a poor arena to hash out these important
questions. Unlike both Midrash and Lighthouse, which considered
facial challenges to ordinances that excluded churches from a given
zoning district,94 Rocky Mountain addressed a challenge to the
county’s unequal application of the existing scheme.95 Given the asapplied nature of this case, the Eleventh/Third Circuit split provides
essentially an illusory distinction.96 Thus, adopting either circuit’s
approach, while it may have fostered greater prospective clarity,
would have forced the court into this divisive issue without it making
a meaningful difference to the outcome of the case at hand.
VI. CONCLUSION
The court’s opinion in Rocky Mountain alluded to two of the
most important issues surrounding application of RLUIPA. The
case’s procedural posture and the issues and arguments briefed by
the county, however, limited the precedential impact of the decision.
Further, the opinion seems to indicate the court’s prudent
93. See id. at 1236–37.
94. See Lighthouse Institute for Evangelism, Inc. v. City of Long Branch, 510 F.3d 253,
257–58 (3d Cir. 2007); Midrash, 366 F.3d at 1219–20.
95. See Rocky Mountain, 605 F.3d at 1236.
96. This is because the Eleventh Circuit’s Konikov decision would require a similarly
situated comparator in as-applied cases, as discussed above. See Konikov v. Orange Cnty., 410
F.3d 1317, 1327–29 (11th Cir. 2005).
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willingness to bide its time and not rush into the similarly situated or
scrutiny questions where the case’s facts do not favor resolution of
the issues. Thus, although Rocky Mountain could have done more to
provide prospective guidance to lower courts, it instead merely set
the stage for future parties to press the court to adopt one of the
existing rules or devise one of its own.
James C. Dunkelberger
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